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LEGISLATION
CORRECTIONAL MATTERs AMENDMENT ACT 5 OF 2011
All the sections of the new Correctional Matters Amendment Act 5
of 2011 came into operation on 1 March 2012, save for section 9
which only comes into operation with regard to sections 36, 37, 49,
49A, 49B, 49C, 49D, and 49F of the Correctional Services Act 111 of
1998 (the principal Act). The Correctional Matters Amendment Act 5
of 2011, repeals certain provisions of the Correctional Services
Amendment Act, 2008, and provides for a new medical parole
system. It also clarifies provisions with regard to parole, and
provides for the management and detention of remand detainees.
With regard to medical parole, section 79 of the principal Act is
replaced by an amended section 79 which provides that any
sentenced offender may be considered for placement on medi-
cal parole by the National Commissioner, the Correctional Super-
vision and Parole Board, or the Minister, if such an offender is
suffering from a terminal disease or condition, or is rendered
physically incapacitated as a result of an injury, disease, or illness
to an extent that severely limits daily activity or inmate self-care.
Furthermore, the risk of re-offending must be low, and appropri-
ate arrangements should be made for the inmate's supervision,
care, and treatment within the community into which he or she is
released. In terms of subsection 2, an application for medical
parolemust be lodged in the prescribed manner by a medical
practitioner, a sentenced offender, or person acting on his/her
behalf. Subsection 3 provides that all such applications must be
accompanied by a written medical report, and the Minister must
establish a Medical Advisory Board to provide an independent
medical report. The placement of a sentenced offender on
medical parole is further subject to the informed consent of the
offender to allow the disclosure of his/her medical information
to the extent necessary, and an agreement by the offender to
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subject himself or herself to monitoring conditions set by the
Correctional Supervision and Parole Board in terms of section 52.
An offender placed under medical parole may also be required to
undergo periodic medical examinations by a medical practitioner
in the employ of the department.
When the Medical Parole Board makes a determination, the
following factors must be taken into consideration: any sentenc-
ing remarks by the trial judge or magistrate; the type of offence
and the length of the sentence remaining; the previous criminal
record of the offender; or any of the factors listed in section
42(2)(d) (see s 79(5)).
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES REGULATIONS
The Minister of Correctional Services published extensive
amendments to the Correctional Services Regulations first pub-
lished in the Government Gazette of 30 July 2004 (see GG 35277,
RG 9739 GN 323 of 25 April 2012). In terms of these regulations,
various aspects relating to the custody of inmates under condi-
tions of human dignity, the classification of sentenced offenders,
and the management, safe custody, and wellbeing of the various
categories of prisoner are set out in detail. Particularly important
is Chapter VI which provides for the release of inmates on day
parole or parole, or their placement under correctional supervi-
sion. Section 29A of this chapter regulates release on medical
parole, and section 29B the appointment and composition of the
Medical Parole Advisory Board.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT 9 OF 2012
The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 9 of 2012 was assented
to on 25 September 2012 (GG 35714 No 782). This Amendment
Act substitutes and aligns the provisions relating to the use of
force in effecting an arrest with the Constitutional Court judgment
in Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others: in re S v
Walters 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC). The new section 49 reads:
Use of force in effecting arrest
49. (1) For the purposes of this section -(a) 'arrestor' means any person authorised under this Act to arrest or
to assist in arresting a suspect; [and](b) 'suspect' means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has
[or had] a reasonable suspicion that such a person is committing
or has committed an offence; and
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(c) 'deadly force' means force that is likely to cause serious bodily
harm or death and includes, but is not limited to, shooting at a
suspect with a firearm.(2) If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect
resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is
clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the
suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may,
in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably
necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the
resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing: Provided that
the arrestor may use deadly force only if -(a) the suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or
any other person; or(b) the suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction
of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means
of effecting the arrest, whether at that time or later.
Section 49(1)(c) now defines deadly force, and two require-
ments are included relating to the reasonable belief of the
arrestor, and the use of deadly force in effecting the arrest
(s 49(2)(a) and (b)).
It remains to be seen whether the new section 49 will provide
greater clarity on exactly when lethal force may be used in
effecting an arrest, and whether the enactment of this provision
will curtail the alleged abuses by police officers in this regard.
CASE LAW
BAIL
A presiding officer cannot preside over both the bail application and the
criminal trial
In S v Bruinders 2012 (1) SACR 25 (WCC), the appellant was
convicted on two robbery charges and a charge of assault with
the intent to do grievous bodily harm. He was sentenced to three
years' imprisonment on the robbery charges, and two years'
imprisonment on the assault charge; an effective sentence of five
years' imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant submitted that he
had appeared before the magistrate on a number of occasions,
including for his bail application, and that the magistrate had
therefore been aware of his previous convictions when he
presided over the trial.
The court of appeal held that it is inimical to an accused's
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial that he or she not be
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tried by the same presiding officer who presided over his or her
bail hearing (para [77]). With reference to section 165(2) of the
Constitution, it was held that it is not only actual bias that vitiates
the proceedings or disqualifiesy a judicial officer from presiding
over a court of law, but also an appearance of bias (para [6]). The
test for apparent bias is well established (see paras [7]-[30] for
an overview of the history and development of this test) and
requires either a real 'danger' of bias, or a likelihood that bias will
occur (para [13]). This apparent bias must also be apparent to
any reasonable, objective and informed observer (para [23]).
With regard to the sentencing magistrate's earlier involvement
in the appellant's trial, it was held that not all involvement between
a judicial officer and an accused will automatically require that
the judicial officer be disqualified from hearing the case. The test
for apparent bias should be applied, and a determination is
required of whether '. . . a reasonable, objective and informed
person would reasonably apprehend that such a presiding officer
would not bring an impartial mind to bear on an adjudication of
the matter' (para [42]). The nature of the involvement, and the
lapse of time between that involvement and the subsequent
adjudication, are also factors to be considered (para [49]).
In this matter, the presiding officer had been involved in the
appellant's bail hearing, and the decisions a court must make in
bail proceedings will generally attract challenges based on an
alleged perception of bias. This is because in a bail hearing, the
presiding officer must consider a number of factors, including
whether the accused has a criminal record, whether he is a flight
risk, and whether there is a likelihood that he will be a danger to
others if released on bail (para [64]). These are all subjective
value considerations that are made against, or in favour of the
bail application. It was held that
it will thus be apparent ... that the inquiry which a court is required to
undertake in bail proceedings is not only an extensive one which
requires more than an armchair approach, but also an exercise which
may, more often than not (particularly where bail is opposed), result in
the court becoming privy to information about the accused, or the
offences with which he/she has been charged, which it would not
ordinarily be possessed of, before the conclusion of the trial of the
accused, and often not even then (para [74]).
With regard to the accused's contention that the presiding
officer had prior knowledge of his previous convictions, it was
held that courts are (generally) sensitive to having evidence (prior
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to sentencing) that may reflect upon the fact that an accused has
previous convictions. In such cases, presiding officers have
either recused themselves (S v Stevens 1961 (3) SA 518 (C)), or
have requested that a higher court set aside a conviction and
sentence because the accused had appeared before the court in
leg-irons or prison garb which showed that they were serving a
sentence of imprisonment, and therefore had a prior conviction
(S v Phiri 2005 (2) SACR 476 (T)) (para [69]). This is primarily
because '[u]nconscious prejudices and bias can be insidious in
their operation on people's minds' (para [76]). (With regard to the
manner and clothing in which prisoners are presented at their
criminal trials in court, see Mvoko & another v Minister of
Correctional Services & others 2012 (1) SACR 472 (ECM) where
the reasonable limitations warranted in ss 26 and 29 of the
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 were considered.)
It is therefore important that a presiding officer recuse him- or
herself from a trial if he or she also presided over the accused's
bail hearing. Even if no real bias exists, justice must also be seen
to be done, and reasonable members of the public cannot have
confidence in and respect for a legal system that allows for
convictions to stand in the face of such an irregularity (paras [81]
and [92]). It was also said that given '. . . the fragile juncture we
have arrived at in our legal system, public confidence in and
respect for the administration of justice require standards today
that may be higher than may have been the case two decades
ago' (para [126]).
Sher AJ and Zondi J for the Western Cape High Court, also
emphasised that the state, and specifically the National Prosecut-
ing Authority, should take greater care in devising a system that
ensures that presiding officers who had presided over a bail
hearing, not be called upon to preside over the subsequent trial
(para [124]).
Nonetheless, in S v Majikazana 2012 (2) SACR 107 (SCA), it
was held that where the accused did not apply for the recusal of a
trial judge at the beginning of the trial based on the fact that the
trial judge had also presided over his bail proceedings, and
the presiding officer did not consider recusing him- or herself for
that same reason, actual bias needs to be proved if an appeal is
to succeed (paras [12]-[13]).
Also see S vAgliotti2012 (1) SACR 559 (GSJ) where it was held
that an accused must be warned regarding the admissibility of
viva voce testimony or evidence through an affidavit at a bail
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hearing in subsequent proceedings in terms of section
60(11 B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA).
Refusal of an extension-ofbail application pending an appeal in terms of
section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
In S v Masoanganye & another 2012 (1) SACR 292 (SCA), the
appellants appealed against their conviction and sentence, and
applied for an extension of their bail pending the finalisation of
their appeal. While the trial court allowed the appeal against their
conviction and sentence, their application for their bail to be
extended was refused.
An application for bail after conviction is regulated by section
321 of the CPA. In terms of this provision, a trial court is only
obliged to suspend the execution of the sentence by reason of an
appeal, if it is of the opinion that it is fit, under the circumstances,
to order that an accused be released on bail. In order for the trial
court to make a determination in terms of section 321 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, the accused must apply for bail and
present the facts necessary to enable the court to exercise its
discretion (para [13]). The fact that an appeal against the
conviction was granted, which implies that there is a reasonable
chance of success on appeal, is not, on its own, sufficient to
entitle an appellant to be released on bail pending the appeal.
More important factors to consider include the seriousness of the
crime, the flight risk the appellant presents, and the real pros-
pects of success of the appeal, as well as the real prospects that
a non-custodial sentence may be imposed (para [14]). The trial
judge is the person best equipped to deal with the issue (para
[15]).
In this matter, however, the trial judge had failed to give
reasons for granting leave to appeal against the conviction and
sentence. This made it difficult to assess whether the appellants
had any real prospect of success on the merits of their case
(paras [16]-[18]).
Does a deceased accused who fails to appear for his/her bail hearing fofeit
his bail?
The South Gauteng High Court (Johannesburg) was con-
fronted with a peculiar question in S v Engelbrecht 2012 (2) SACR
212 (GSJ). The accused was released on bail pending his trial for
the murder of his wife and paraplegic son. He later died in a road
accident - his cause of death was recorded as 'unnatural', as it
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was believed that he had committed suicide (para [3]). The
question was whether the accused had forfeited his bail by failing
to appear at his criminal trial (s 67 of the CPA).
In terms of section 67(1) of the CPA, three consequences follow
if an accused released on bail fails to appear for his/her criminal
trial: the court must declare the bail provisionally cancelled, the
bail money must be provisionally forfeited to the state, and a
warrant for the accused's arrest must be issued. These actions
are, however, absurd where it is known that the accused is dead
and is therefore no longer at liberty on bail, or able to appear
before the court (para [7]). It was consequently held that a
deceased accused, released on bail pending criminal proceed-
ings, does not forfeit the bail money paid, irrespective of whether
he or she died from natural or unnatural causes (paras [14]-[15]).
BREACH OF PAROLE CONDITIONS
The applicant in Ntontela v Minister of Correctional Services &
others 2012 (2) SACR 487 (GSJ), was convicted of contravening
provisions of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 and sentenced to three
years' imprisonment. He was then granted parole, subject to
conditions, before the expiry of his sentence in terms of section
73(4) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. The parole
conditions included that the applicant report to a correctional
supervision official once a month, and that he adhere to compul-
sory periods of house detention during which he was not allowed
to leave his primary residence (para [6]).
As the applicant did not comply with these conditions, the
respondents issued a warrant for his arrest under section 70(1) of
the Correctional Services Act. Section 70(2)(b) of the Act pro-
vides that where a person has been arrested and is detained in
terms of such an arrest, he or she must be brought before a court
within 48 hours of arrest. The court must then order the further
detention of that person and refer the matter to the responsible
authority (para [9]). In this matter, however, the applicant did not
appear before a court, and no court order was made with regard
to his further detention or referral to an appropriate authority (para
[10]). Instead, within 48 hours of his arrest, the applicant was
returned directly to prison where he appeared before a supervi-
sion committee (para [12]). On the recommendation of this
committee, the applicant's parole was cancelled in terms of
section 75(2)(a) of the Correctional Services Act (para [13]).
Satchwell J for the South Gauteng High Court (Johannesburg),
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described the revocation of the applicant's parole as the 'with-
drawal of an indulgence'. 'The indulgence was one granted by
the Department of Correctional Services in respect of a criminal
sanction imposed by a court of law. All the Department of
Correctional Services, ie the National Commissioner through his
servants, has done is to restore the position to that which it was,
prior to exercising its discretion to grant an early release on
parole. . .' (para [22]). It was further held that the court has no
power to usurp the authority of the supervision committee or
the Correctional Services Parole Board, or to interfere with the
actions taken or the decisions made by these authorities (para
[25]).
CORRECTION OF A SENTENCE IN TERMS OF SECTION 298 OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The accused in S v Matshiba 2012 (1) SACR 577 (ECG),
pleaded guilty and was convicted of six counts of housebreaking
with intent to steal and theft, as well as a seventh count of theft.
He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on each of the first
six counts and to two years' imprisonment on the seventh count.
The sentences were not ordered to run concurrently, and the
appellant consequently had to serve an effective sentence of 62
years' imprisonment (para [2]). Twenty-one days after imposing
the sentence, the magistrate ordered that the sentences on the
first five counts run concurrently, imposing a sentence of an
effective 22 years' imprisonment (para [3]).
In terms of section 298 of the CPA, a presiding officer who has
imposed a wrong sentence can amend it before, or immediately
after it has been recorded. This provision does not, however,
empower a court to alter the sentence if the of the amendment
changes the content or general meaning of the sentence. Once a
court has imposed a sentence, it is functus officio and the
sentence cannot be changed (para [8]).
In this instance, the amendment was not made immediately
before or after the recording of the sentence, and the amendment
imposed additional terms to the original sentence. It was conse-
quently held that the magistrate's alteration of the sentence did
not comply with the provisions of section 298 of the CPA (para
[12]).
THE DUTY OF POLICE INVESTIGATORS AND PROSECUTORS WITH
REGARD TO THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF SUSPECTS AND ACCUSED
The plaintiffs in Botha v Minister of Safety and Security and
others; January v Minister of Safety and Security and others 2012
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(1) SACR 305 (ECP), were arrested without a warrant on a charge
of murder on 16 March 2008, and were detained in custody until
their first appearance in court on 19 March 2008. They were then
remanded in custody until 18 April 2008, at which time Botha was
released on bail, and the charges against January were with-
drawn. The plaintiffs claimed damages from the defendants for
their alleged unlawful arrest and detention up to 19 March 2008,
as well as their further detention until their release on 18 April
2008.
The plaintiffs argued that the arresting officer and/or the other
policemen involved, knew or should have known that there were
no reasonable, objective grounds or justification for their deten-
tion. It was also argued that the defendants had failed in their
duty to inform the relevant prosecutors dealing with the matter
that there were no grounds or justification for the detention, and
indeed no objective facts reasonably linking the plaintiffs to the
alleged murder (para [4]). It was further argued that the prosecu-
tors involved had failed in their duty to acquaint themselves with
the contents of the police docket which showed clearly that there
were no reasonable grounds or justification for the plaintiffs'
continued detention. It was submitted that the prosecutors had
failed to withdraw the charges against the plaintiffs timeously, and
had failed to inform the presiding officer expeditiously that there
were no objective facts reasonably linking the plaintiffs to the
alleged murder. It was also argued that the prosecutors had a
duty to ascertain independently that no reasonable grounds or
justification existed for the continued detention of the plaintiffs,
and had failed to take steps to ensure that the plaintiffs were
released from detention as soon as possible (para [5]).
The defendants argued that, apart from placing a fair and
honest statement of the relevant facts before the prosecutor, an
investigating officer has no legal duty to make representations to
a prosecutor on the grounds or justification for the continued
detention of an awaiting trial prisoner who has appeared before a
court. It was argued that at that point, it is the prosecutor who is
solely responsible for objecting to the release of an awaiting trail
prisoner and to make representations to the presiding officer on
the further detention of an accused (para [6]).
The court was not convinced by this argument. It held that
there is a duty on the state and all its organs not to perform any
act that infringes on any person's fundamental rights, including
their right to freedom and security of the person (s 12 of the
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Constitution, 1996). Police officers must, furthermore, exercise
their powers in accordance with section 13 of the South African
Police Service Act 68 of 1995, which provides that official action
is subject to the Constitution and must be performed with due
regard to every person's fundamental rights (para [19]). Police
officers must, therefore, assess and evaluate whether there are
grounds or justifications for a suspect or accused's further
detention (para [27]). Police officers also have a legal duty to
inform prosecutors of information which would justify the further
detention of suspects and/or the accused (para [30]). This is
important because it is the assessment of police officials on
whether a detention is justified, that will ultimately enable the
prosecutor and the presiding officer to make an informed deci-
sion whether there is any legal justification for the further deten-
tion of a suspect/accused (para [30]).
Similarly, prosecutors are obliged to establish the facts of the
case which would justify the further detention of a suspect or
accused (para [33]) And, where the police docket does not
include information justifying the further detention of such indi-
viduals, the prosecutor has a duty to establish from the investiga-
tor, facts which would justify such further detention (para [34]).
This duty on the prosecution to place all relevant facts before a
court, was also emphasised in S v Sithole & others 2012 (1) SACR
586 (KZD) in an appeal on an application for bail; and again in S v
Nhlapo 2012 (2) SACR 358 (GSJ) with regard to proof of previous
convictions by way of an SAP69 form, and for the purpose of
sentencing proceedings.
GUIDELINES FOR ENQUIRIES IN TERMS OF SECTION 77 OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The accused in S v Matu 2012 (1) SACR 68 (ECB), was
charged with assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. He
was referred for mental observation and the prosecutor subse-
quently submitted the psychiatric evaluation in accordance with
section 79 of the CPA. In this report, the accused was diagnosed
with, inter alia, 'psychotic disorder' (an Axis 1 diagnosis). The
section 79 panel also concluded that the accused was unable
to follow court proceedings so as to offer a proper defence, and
that he had most probably been mentally ill when he committed the
offence and woul therefore have been unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his actions. It was recommended that the
accused be dealt with as a state patient in terms of section 77(6) of
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the CPA, and that he be detained until discharged by a judge in
accordance with section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of
2002 (para [7]).
The magistrate consequently held a section 77 enquiry in the
absence of the accused's legal representative, and despite
the severe consequences that a section 77 enquiry held for the
accused. (The consequences of a s 77 enquiry can be servere as
an accused can be detained indefinitely depending on the
outcome, not as a result of his actions, but due to a lack of
understanding and an inability to make a proper defence (para
[12], see also S vZondi2012 (2) SACR 445 (KZP).)
In the Matucase, the magistrate committed a number of errors:
First, she made a determination on whether the accused was
capable of understanding the proceedings and making a
defence before she continued with the section 77 enquiry;she did
not establish whether the section 79 report was disputed; she
merely accepted that the prosecutor accepted the section 79
report; and she failed to ask the accused whether he wished to
dispute the finding (para [14]). The magistrate also, erroneously,
ordered that the accused be admitted and detained in an
institution as an involuntary mental health care user under section
37 of the Mental Health Care Act, based on his denial of guilt and
on the superficial questioning that she had conducted (para
[17]).
Based on the fundamental errors that the trial magistrate had
made in this section 77 enquiry, the review court formulated the
following guidelines for section 77 proceedings
* First, a court must consider whether the section 79 report is
compliant with the provisions of that section in all the neces-
sary respects.
* Next, it should consider the import and effect of the findings of
the panel, and whether these findings were made unani-
mously. The court must also establish whether the report is
disputed by either the prosecutor or the accused, and note
the responses of both parties on the record.
* If the report reflects the unanimous finding of all members of
the panel, and is not disputed by either the prosecutor or the
accused, the court may proceed to determine the matter
based on the report and without hearing further evidence.
* However, where the finding of the panel is not unanimous, or
is disputed by the prosecutor or the accused, the court should
invite the parties to adduce evidence on the basis set out in
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section 77(3), and the court must offer any assistance neces-
sary with regard to the issue of subpoenas, etc. The court
should also invite and allow the accused if he or she wishes
and is able to do so, to testify and to cross-examine all the
witnesses.
* If the report states that the accused is capable of understand-
ing the proceedings and presenting a proper defence, it
should make a determination in terms of section 77(5) that the
proceedings be continued in the ordinary way.
* If the report states that the accused is not capable of
understanding the proceedings and making a proper
defence, the court must make a determination in terms of
section 77(6).
* The court must make its determination on a balance of
probabilities whether in terms of subsection (5) or (6).
* Where a determination is made in terms of subsection (6), the
court must establish if it can be proved, on a balance of
probabilities, that there is evidence available that the accused
committed the offence. Alternaty, it should consider whether it
is necessary to invoke its discretion to order that evidence be
placed before it to determine the issue. It is, however,
important that evidence is placed before the court linking the
accused to the offence with which he or she is charged (S v
Dewhurst2012 (1) SACR 627 (ECP)).
* After hearing evidence or making a value judgment as
the case may be, the court should determine whether the
accused committed the offence based on the strength of
assurances given with regard to the available evidence.
* Allied to the question of whether the accused committed the
act in question, the court should also establish whether the act
resorts under the first category (a serious offence), or is a less
serious (non-violent) offence. With a serious and violent
offence a directive in terms of section 77(6)(a)(i) must be
issued on form MC20, and for a non-violent offence, a
directive must be issued in terms of section 77(6)(a)(ii) on
form MC21 (para [29]).
Where the accused is charged with a serious offence like
murder, culpable homicide, rape, or any other offence involving
serious violence, the court should order that the accused be
detained in a psychiatric hospital or a prison pending the
decision of a judge in chambers in terms of section 47 of
the Mental Health Care Act 2002 (section 77(6)(a)(i)). For all other
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offences the court must order that the accused be detained in an
institution as an involuntary mental health care user as contem-
plated in section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2002, (section
77(6)(a)(ii)).
The court's finding and order in terms of the Mental Health Care
Act is furthermore dependent on the provisions of section 77(6)
with regard to the finding whether the accused is actually guilty of
the offence with which he or she is charged (para [18]). As
regards this finding, it is important to note that the accused's guilt
need only be established on a balance of probabilities and is not
subject to the criminal burden of beyond a reasonable doubt
(para [21]). However, this finding must still provide the necessary
jurisdictional basis for the next stage of the enquiry, which is to
determine whether the act committed falls under either section
77(6)(a)(i), a serious offence, or section 77(6)(aXii), a less serious
(non-violent) offence (para [21]).
In Matu, the magistrate was incorrect in finding that the
accused should be detained in terms of section 37 of the Mental
Care Act. The evidence showed, on a balance of probabilities,
that the accused indeed committed an offence of a violent nature,
and based on this he should have been detained under section
47 of the Mental Care Act (para [27]). It was also held that a
substantial injustice had resulted from the accused's being
unrepresented at the enquiry.The matter was remitted back to the
magistrate to be reheard (para [28]). See also S v Sikutu 2012 (2)
SACR 342 (ECB) which deals with section 78 of the CPA, and
where it was alleged that, at the time of the commission of the
offence, the accused was not able to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his actions and to act accordingly. Here the court
emphasised that expert evidence is required for a court to make
a determination in this regard.
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF AN OFFENCE AND
SUBJECT TO A FORFEITURE ORDER
In Van der Burg & another v National Director of Public
Prosecutions & another 2012 (2) SACR 331 (CC), the applicants
- a married couple with three children - ran an illegal shebeen
from a residential property of which they were the registered
owners. They had previously applied for a liquor licence without
success as there were four licensed liquor outlets within a radius
of 400m of the property. Their neighbours had also complained
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repeatedly about the shebeen and the negative impact it had on
the neighbourhood (para [11]). There had been more than 50
police actions and eighteen arrests recorded against the prop-
erty, together with numerous oral and written warnings (para
[12]). As these actions had had no effect, the National Director of
Public Prosecutions (NDPP) was granted a provisional preserva-
tion order against the property. When the applicants continued
with their unlawful activity despite this provisional preservation
order, the NDPP applied for, and was granted, a forfeiture order
against the property in terms of section 50(1)(a) of the Prevention
of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (para [15]).
The applicants appealed against this forfeiture order, arguing
that their residence could not be an instrumentality of an offence
as envisaged in POCA, as the illegal sale of liquor is not an
offence in terms of Chapter 6 of POCA which relates only to
'organised crime offences' and not criminal activity by individu-
als. They also argued that the forfeiture was 'manifestly dispro-
portionate' to the offence they had committed (para [16]). The
applicants further relied on their constitutional right to access to
adequate housing, and argued that the rights of their children
would also be infringed should the forfeiture order be upheld
(para [26]).
In a majority decision for the Constitutional Court, Van der
Westhuizen J found that the illegal sale of liquor was indeed an
offence falling within the ambit of POCA. The provisions of POCA
are designed to reach far beyond organised crime, and apply
equally to cases of individual wrongdoing (para [35], National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden 2007 (1) SACR 338
(SCA)). It was held that '... although POCA does not explicitly
identify the unlawful activity or offence at issue in this matter, the
ex facie language of the statute, as well as its aims, suggest that
its forfeiture provisions do apply to the property at which the
unlawful selling of liquor occurs' (para [38]).
In considering the proportionality requirement of the forfeiture
order, the court noted the numerous attempts by the authorities to
use conventional law enforcement strategies to curtail the appli-
cants' illegal activities. It was clear from the evidence presented,
that the forfeiture sought was a last resort to end to the criminality
' . by removing the main instrument used in its commission'
(para [51]). It was further held that while the illegal sale of liquor is
not necessarily 'organised crime' or generally regarded as a
serious crime, the way in which it had been committed, together
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with the harm its commission had caused many in the applicants'
neighbourhood (including their own children) '. . must result in a
conclusion that forfeiture is proportionate and appropriate in this
case' (para [56]).
With regard to the imminent consequence that the applicants
and their children would be left homeless should the forfeiture
order succeed, the Constitutional Court found that their monthly
income from selling fruit and vegetables would enable them to
rent another residence and support their children. And, in weigh-
ing up the best interests of the applicants' children as per section
28(2) of the Constitution, it was held that it was not in their best
interests to be exposed to the applicants' illegal activities in their
own home, and that a Children's Court should determine whether
the applicants' children are in need of care and protection as per
section 47(1) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (para [79). It was
consequently confirmed that the residential property of the
applicants be forfeited to the state in terms of POCA (para [83]).
JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Incarceration as an appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender
In S v BF 2012 (1) SACR 298 (SCA), the appellant was
convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances and rape,
and was sentenced to fifteen and ten years' imprisonment
respectively; an effective term of fifteen years' imprisonment. On
appeal, the court had to consider whether the trial court had
misdirected itself in imposing such a lengthy custodial sentence
on a juvenile who was fourteen years and ten months of age when
he committed the offences.
It was contended by the appellant that the applicability of
subsections 51(1) and (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
105 of 1997, was first raised at sentencing. And, the failure to
promptly and pertinently bring these provisions of the Minimum
Sentencing Act to the attention of the accused sooner rather than
later, may preclude their application in this instance. It was also
held that section 51(6) of the Act explicitly prohibits the applica-
tion of subsections 51(1) and (2) to a child under the age of
sixteen years at the time of the commission of the offence in
question. This, the trial court had overlooked. Reference was also
made to the constitutional imperative of section 28(1)(g) which
provides that juveniles should be incarcerated as a measure of
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last resort, and may be detained only for the shortest possible
period (para [15]).
However, based on the wording of this constitutional provision
(that juveniles maybe incarcerated), it was held that the law does
not prohibit the incarceration of children, but that all the factors of
the particular case ought to be taken into consideration. In this
instance, the seriousness of the crimes of which the appellant
was convicted required that his youthfulness be balanced
against the interests of society, the interests of the victim, and the
deterrent and retributive elements that a just punishment
required. The appellant's youthfulness also required that the
punishment include a strong rehabilitative component (para [8]).
It was found that the only factor that counted in the appellant's
favour was his relatively young age (para [13]), and that the
seriousness of the offences, its cumulative effect, and the fact
that the appellant and his co-accused had pre-planned their
illegal actions, convinced the court that a custodial sentence was
the only appropriate sentence in the circumstances (para [14]).
However, given the requirement of section 28(1)(g) of the Consti-
tution that juveniles be incarcerated for the shortest period
possible, the sentence was amended to ten years' imprisonment
for the robbery, and twelve years' imprisonment for the rape.
These sentences were ordered to run concurrently and the
appellant was to serve an effective twelve years' imprisonment.
See also S v L 2012 (2) SAR 399 (WCC), Director of Public
Prosecutions, North Gauteng, Pretoria v Thusi and others 2012
(1) SACR 423 (SCA), and S v RS 2012 (2) SACR 160 (WCC). In
the latter case it was emphasised that due cognisance be given
to the provisions of the Child Justice Act, and specifically Chapter
10, before a sentence is imposed on a juvenile offender. In S v
Gani NO 2012 (2) SACR 468 (GSJ) and S v MK 2012 (2) SACR
533 (GSJ), it was emphasised that, where appropriate, diversion
must always be considered in terms of section 53 of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008.
Reviewability of a sentence in terms of sections 76 and 85 of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008
In S v CS 2012 (1) SACR 595 (ECP), the accused (who was
seventeen years of age) was convicted of contravening the
provisions of sections 66(2) and 89(1) of the National Road Traffic
Act 93 of 1996, i e using a motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner. The accused was also convicted of housebreaking with
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the intent to steal and theft. For the purposes of sentencing, the
two counts were taken together and the accused was sentenced
in terms of sections 76(1) and 71(3) of the Child Justice Act 75 of
2008, to compulsory residence in a child-and-youth care centre
for a minimum period of two years (para [2]). The primary
question was whether the matter qualified for automatic review
under section 85 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.
Section 85 of the Act requires the automatic review, in terms of
section 304 of the CPA, of all cases where the child was under the
age of sixteen years at the time of the alleged offence, or was
sixteen years or older, but under the age of eighteen years, and
was sentenced to any form of imprisonment that was not wholly
suspended, or any sentence of compulsory residence in a
child-and-youth care centre providing programmes as referred to
in section 191(2)(j) of the Children's Act. However, the trial
magistrate questioned whether this automatic review procedure
applies in cases where the child is legally represented (para [7]).
Tshiki and Beshe JJ for the Eastern Cape High Court, Port
Elizabeth, confirmed that legal representation for all minors in a
Child Justice Court is compulsory, and the working of section 85
is consequently not dependent on the absence of legal represen-
tation for the child at the trial and sentencing phase of the
proceedings (para [11]). It was also held that section 85 will apply
irrespective of the length of the sentence imposed or whether it
was imposed by a magistrate or a regional magistrate (para [20]).
The automatic review envisaged in section 85 of the Child Justice
Act 75 of 2008 is an exception and is not conducted in terms of
section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and
therefore need not meet the requirements of that section. For a
conflicting judgment on this issue see S vJan Nakedi(unreported
case 12/2011 North West High Court 2 January 2012 per Gutta J,
Landman J concurring ).
LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND THE TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS OF SECTION
136 OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT 111 OF 1998
Prison administration, and more specifically community correc-
tions, in South Africa are currently governed by the Correctional
Services Act 111 of 1998, and where applicable, its predecessor,
the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959, together with the relevant
policies and guidelines under each of these Acts (Van Vuren v
Minister of Correctional Services & others 2012 (1) SACR 103
(CC) para [24]). The previous parole regime was prescribed in
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sections 63 and 65 of the Correctional Services Act of 1959, and
remained in force in the same form from 1993 until 1 October
2004. These provisions did not provide for minimum detention
periods to be served before a prisoner could be considered for
release on parole. Such minimum detention periods were rather
prescribed by ministerial policy and varied from time to time
(para [89]). From 1987 to 1994, for example, offenders could -
absent exceptional circumstances - be considered for release
on parole after they had served ten years of their life imprison-
ment term. Such prisoners were, however, rarely released before
having served fifteen years of their sentence. This minimum
detention period was increased to twenty years in March 1994
(para [89]), and it was recommended that prisoners who had
attained 65 years of age be considered for parole after having
served fifteen years of their sentences (para [25]).
The process for prisoners serving life sentences under the 1959
Act, required a Parole Board to submit a report to the Minister of
Correctional Services, or to the Commissioner of Correctional
Services, on the eligibility of a prisoner to be considered for release
on parole (s 63(1)). The Minister or the Commissioner then referred
the report to the National Advisory Council for Correctional Services,
which made a final recommendation to the Minister on whether or
not the prisoner should be released on parole (para [88]). For
prisoners serving determinate sentences, the Commissioner
decided on parole (para [90]).
Two new parole processes came into operation under the 1998
Act, the first on 1 October 2004, and the second towards the end
of September 2009 (para [91]). In terms of the first, the Correc-
tional Supervision and Parole Board made a recommendation to
the court on whether a particular prisoner serving a life sentence
was eligible to be released on parole (para [92]). Today, however,
the latest parole process requires that the Case Management
Committee (CMC) of each correctional institution submit a report
to the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board, which has
replaces the Parole Board under the 1959 Act. This Board is
appointed by the Minister of Correctional Services and makes a
recommendation to the Minister on the granting of parole in
respect of an offender serving life incarceration (para [26]).
The 1998 Act also provides for minimum detention periods to
be served before a prisoner can be considered for release on
parole. Section 73(6)(b)(iv) of this Act provides that prisoners
serving life sentences may not be placed on parole until they
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have served at least 25 years of their sentence, or, if such
prisoners have attained the age of 65 years, after having served
at least fifteen years of their sentence (para [30]). On 19 February
1999, before the new Act came into operation, transitional
provisions were enacted, the most important of which for present
purposes, is section 136, which came into operation on
14 December 2001.
Section 136(1) provides that any person serving a sentence of
imprisonment immediately before the commencement of Chap-
ters IV, VI and VII, is subject to the provisions of the previous Act
for placement under community correction. Such a prisoner will,
therefore, be considered for release and placement on parole by
the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board, in terms of the
policy and guidelines applied by the former Parole Board before
the commencement of the relevant chapters of the 1998 Act (para
[31]). Section 136(3)(a), on the other hand, provides that prison-
ers serving life imprisonment immediately before the commence-
ment of Chapters IV, VI and VII, are entitled to be considered for
day parole after having served twenty years of their sentence.
In Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional Services & others 2012
(1) SACR 103 (CC), the proper interpretation of this transitional
provision (s 136(3)(a) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of
1998) was considered. The applicant had been convicted on
various charges in 1992, and sentenced to death alongside two
sentences of five years' and three years' imprisonment for theft
and possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition,
respectively. On 20 September 2000, however, following the
abolition of the death penalty in S v Makwanyane & another 1995
(3) SA 391 (CC), the applicant's death sentence was commuted
to incarceration for life antedated to 13 November 1992, the date
on which applicant had been sentenced and in accordance with
section 1(11) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997. The
applicant's determinate sentences were to run concurrently with
the life sentence (para [6]).
Upon learning of the outcome in the case of Plank v Minister of
Correctional Services and others (GSJ case No 2005/14313 [no
date] unreported), the applicant in the Van Vuren case enquired
about his prospects of being considered for release on parole. In
the Plank case, the applicant had been sentenced to death on
6 March 1990, and his sentence commuted to life imprisonment
on 7 August 2003. Plank was eventually considered for parole (in
terms of an out of court settlement) after having served only
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thirteen years of his life term, and in terms of the criteria, policies
and statutes that applied in 1990 when he was sentenced to
death. However, upon Van Vuren's enquiry, the Provisional Com-
missioner of Correctional Services informed him that he could
only be considered for parole after having served twenty years of
his sentence, and that no amnesties and credits (which were
considered in terms of the previous parole regime) would play a
role in the assessment process. The Commissioner also advised
that prisoners serving sentences of life imprisonment from 1959
to 1994, would be considered for parole after having served ten
years of their sentences (para [7]).
Van Vuren, however, argued that the words 'policy and guide-
lines' in section 136 of the new Act, must be construed as
referring to policy and guidelines operative at the time when he
was originally sentenced in 1992. And, that these policies and
guidelines made him eligible for consideration for placement on
parole after having served ten, but not more than fifteen years of
his sentence (para [14]). The High Court (Van Vuren & others v
State GNP case No A682/2000, 20 September 2000), however,
found that section 136(3)(a) overrides section 136(1) and the
policy and guidelines referred to therein. Section 136(1) was held
to apply to all prison sentences except life imprisonment, and
section 136(3)(a) specifically to prisoners serving life imprison-
ment (para [15]).
Interpreting section 136, the Constitutional Court focused on an
holistic reading of all the relevant provisions of the new Act. First,
it held that section 73(6) now requires that all prisoners sen-
tenced to life imprisonment serve 25 years of their sentence
before being considered for release on parole. This section
applies to all sentences passed after the commencement of the
new Act (para [59]). For those prisoners sentenced to life
imprisonment during the period 1 March 1994 to 3 April 1995
when the twenty year pre-parole minimum was introduced,
section 136(3)(a) preserves an entitlement to be considered for
release on parole after having served twenty years of their
sentence. Finally, section 136(1) preserves the position of those
sentenced to life incarceration even earlier, before 1 March 1994.
Van Vuuren fell into this category (para [59]).
This conclusion was reached on the basis of the two phrases
'immediately before' and 'prior to' in section 136(1). It was held
that '. . .the adverbial phrase of time "immediately before" refers
to the category of persons serving custodial sentences'. And, the
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phrase 'prior to' refers to the applicable policy and guidelines
(para [57]). It was further held that 'prior to' has a broader
meaning than 'immediately before', and refers to all the appli-
cable policies and guidelines at any time before 2004 when
Chapters IV, VI and VII came into effect (para [57]). Section
136(1), therefore, preserves the policies and guidelines applied
by the former Parole Board before 2004 (para [58]).
With specific reference to Van Vuren's sentence, it was held
that section 136(1) preserves the policies and guidelines in
existence in 2000 when Van Vuren's death sentence was com-
muted to life incarceration, and which required that a minimum
period of twenty years' imprisonment be served before consider-
ation of release on parole (para [64]). However, Van Vuren's
sentence was also backdated to 13 November 1992, when he
was first sentenced, an advantage granted Van Vuren by a full
court which cannot be taken away arbitrarily (para [64]). By
antedating the sentence, the full court gave Van Vuren the
privilege of being considered for placement on parole in terms of
the policies and guidelines applicable in November 1992. In
terms of these policies and guidelines, Van Vuren was eligible for
parole after having served ten years of his life sentence, although
placement before fifteen years occurred in exceptional circum-
stances only (para [66]). It was consequently held that Van Vuren
was eligible for consideration for parole under section 136(1) of
the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (para [70]).
The majority for the Constitutional Court found that section
136(3) applies only to offenders sentenced after March 1994, and
that section 136(1) applies to all offenders serving determinate
sentences, as well as those serving life imprisonment who were
sentenced before March 1994 (para [137]).
However, in a minority judgment, Yacoob J and Ngcobo CJ
argued that offenders should rather be considered for parole in
terms of the policies, guidelines, and procedures applicable at
the date of parole consideration (para [84]). They rightly held
that: 'The idea that a person sentenced in 1974 must be
considered for parole in 1994 in terms of the policies applicable
in 1974 cannot be accepted. Indeed the policies and guidelines
must be determined in terms of societal conditions at the time that
parole applications are considered, not at the time that the
offenders concerned were sentenced' (para [139]). Yacoob and
Ngcobo interpreted section 136 of the Correctional Services Act
111 of 1998 as providing for prisoners serving determinate
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sentences under subsections (1) and (2), and prisoners serving
life sentences under subsections (3) and (4). Subsections (3) and
(4), therefore, qualify subsections (1) and (2) by limiting their
application to prisoners not serving a life sentence. In reaching
this conclusion, Yacoob and Ngcobo emphasised the textual
differences between the four subsections; subsections (1) and
(2) refer to 'release and placement' which suggests prisoners
serving a determinate sentence, while subsections (3) and (4)
use the phrase 'to be considered for day parole and parole' which
suggests prisoners serving life sentences (para [121]). In sub-
sections (2) reference is made to '. . . a prisoner who is serving a
determinate sentence of imprisonment as contemplated in sub-
section (1)' which clearly shows that subsection (1) is restricted to
offenders serving a determinate sentence (para [132]). It was
also held that if section 136(1) applied to all sentenced offenders,
the parole procedure for all sentenced offenders would be
identical. There is no reason why the legislator would abolish the
differentiation (as described above) for the transitional period,
and then reinstate it at the end of the transition (para [127]).
The minority judgment also criticised the majority for '.
[coming] close to rewriting the legislation and hence [conferring]
upon legislative bodies powers and duties those bodies do not
have' (para [130]). While the majority recognised the difficulties
with finding that section 136(1) applies to offenders serving life
sentences, this did not convince them that section 136(1) does
not apply to prisoners, like Van Vuuren, serving life sentences.
The majority, it was held, failed to establish what body was to
consider such parole applications. They merely equated the
Correctional Supervision and Parole Board with the current Case
Management Committees, and required the latter to submit a
report to the National Council, even though the Case Manage-
ment Committees are strictly limited to prisoners serving determi-
nate sentences and have no power over prisoners serving life
sentences (para [130]). The role of the National Council was also
completely disregarded in the process, even though it is required
to make a recommendation to the Minister with regard to the
eligibility of a prisoner serving a life sentence to be released on
parole (para [131]).
In my view, the minority judgment in the Van Vuren case and its
interpretation of the transitional provisions in section 136, is
consonant with the development of the Correctional Services
legislation, and provides a bridge between the old and new
parole regimes (para [140]).
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See also Derby-Lewis v Minister of Correctional Services 2009
(2) SACR 522 (GNP), and Van Wyk v Minister of Correctional
Services & another 2012 (1) SACR 159 (GNP), which dealt with
the preservation of the policies and guidelines provided for in
section 22A of the 1959 Act which allowed for the allocation and
accumulation of credits by prisoners based on their observance
of the rules of the correctional institution, and their active partici-
pation in programmes aimed at their treatment, training, and
rehabilitation. These credits were, and can to a limited extent and
within the framework of section 136 of the 1998 Act still be, taken
into account when determining the date on which a parole board
may consider the placement of a prisoner on parole (para [8]).
THE NATIONAL ROAD TRAFFIC ACT 93 OF 1996
Duplication ofpunishment
The appellant in S v Kriel 2012 (1) SACR 1 (SCA), was
convicted of driving under the influence of liquor in contravention
of section 65(1)(a) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996,
and two counts of culpable homicide. The two counts of culpable
homicide arose from two people having died in a collision the
appellant had caused whilst driving in his intoxicated condition.
The appellant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for
contravening section 65(1)(a) of the National Road Traffic Act 93
of 1996, and to eight years' imprisonment on the two counts of
culpable homicide. Two years of this eight-year term were
suspended for five years on condition that he was not again
convicted on a charge of culpable homicide involving a motor
collision. The appellant's driving licence was also suspended for
a period of two years, and he was declared unfit to possess a
firearm licence in terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control
Act 60 of 2000.
However, three days after sentencing, the magistrate indicated
that there had been an oversight on his part, and that the terms of
imprisonment were to run concurrently, resulting in an effective
term of six years' imprisonment. However, recognising that he
was functus officio, the magistrate also expressed concern about
his competence to rectify the sentences and the matter was
referred to the KwaZulu-Natal High Court on urgent, special
review.
On review, it was held that a duplication of punishment had
taken place in this matter as the magistrate also considered the
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two counts of culpable homicide when he imposed the maximum
sentence of six years' imprisonment on count 1 - the conviction
in terms of section 65(1)(a) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of
1996. First offenders convicted for driving under the influence of
alcohol are generally not sentenced to direct imprisonment but to
a fine, or alternatively to imprisonment of which a portion is
suspended. The magistrate therefore ought to have made a
clearer distinction between the three counts when he imposed
sentence.
Disqualification from obtaining a driver's licence
The statutory provisions of the National Road Traffic Act dealing
with the suspension and disqualification of an offender's driver's
licence or permit were considered in a number of cases in 2012.
Section 34(1) provides that a court may, subject to section 35,
and in addition to imposing a sentence, issue an order suspend-
ing the offender's driver's licence or permit or, disqualifying that
offender from obtaining a driver's licence or permit. Section
35(1), on the other hand, provides for compulsory minimum
periods of suspension of an offender's driver's licence and/or
permit where he or she has been found guilty of certain offences
in terms of sections 61, 63 and 65 of the National Road Traffic Act.
While subsections 34(a) and (b) allow courts a discretion to
suspend an offender's driver's licence, section 35(1) mandates
the compulsory suspension of a driver's licence for certain mini-
mum periods in the case of the commission of certain offences and
with due consideration of previous offences. Section 35(3) of the
Act further provides that if the court is satisfied that the circum-
stances surrounding the offence do not justify the suspension or
disqualification of the offender's driver's licence and/or permit, it
may order that suspension or disqualification not take effect.
In S v Vekeni 2012 (1) SACR 458 (ECG), the accused was
convicted of a contravention of section 65(2)(a) of the National
Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 for driving a motor vehicle on a public
road when the concentration of alcohol in his blood was not less
than 0,05 grams per 100 millilitres of blood, specifically 0,29
grams. The accused was sentenced to two years' imprisonment
in terms of section 276(1)(i) of the CPA. The magistrate made an
order in terms of section 34(1)(c) of the National Road Traffic Act
in terms of which the accused was disqualified from obtaining a
driver's licence or permit for a period of ten years from the date of
sentencing (para [7]).
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However, the record reflected that the magistrate merely
explained the provisions of section 35(1) of the National Road
Traffic Act which provides that an offender's driving licence or
permit may be suspended, and that he or she may be barred
from obtaining a licence for a period of at least ten years for a
third or subsequent offence. This provision was relevant to the
accused's case as he already had two previous convictions
under the National Road Traffic Act. The magistrate did not
explain subsections 35(2) and (3) to the accused. The accused
did not give testimony under oath, but merely addressed the
court (para [11]).
It was submitted that had the accused been informed of
subsections 35(2) and (3),he may have elected to give evidence
under oath and request that the suspension and disqualification
not take effect (para [10]). The order made in terms of section
34(1)(c) was consequently set aside and the matter referred back
to the trial court (para [12]).
In S v Van Rooyen 2012 (2) SACR 141 (ECG), the magistrate
ordered that the appellant's driving licence be suspended for a
period of five years in terms of section 35(1) of the National Road
Traffic Act 93 of 1996. The appellant was charged with and
convicted of a contravention of section 65(2)(a) read with section
89(1) of the Act, driving a motor vehicle on a public road when his
blood alcohol was in excess of the statutory limit (para [1]). In
suspending the appellant's driver's licence, the magistrate also
took into account the appellant's previous conviction in terms of
section 65(1)(a) of the Act, viewing the appellant's current
conviction as his second offence (para [5]). The appellant argued
that this was a misdirection as subsections 65(1) and 65(2)
created two separate offences, and his present conviction in
terms of section 65(2) could not, therefore, be regarded as a
second offence simply because it was an alcohol related driving
offence similar to the offence created in section 65(1) of the Act
(para [13]). The primary question in this case was, therefore,
whether the compulsory suspension of an offender's driving
licence for the minimum periods set out in section 35 of the Act
are aimed at repeat offenders of the same offence, or repeat
offenders of similar or related offences (para [17]).
Van Zyl and Mjali JJ for the Eastern Cape High Court (Grahams-
town), held that from the wording of the Act it was clear that a
conviction for an offence listed in section 35(1) of the Act
constituted a 'first', 'second' or 'third or subsequent' offence for
the purposes of subsections 35(2) and (3) (para [20]).
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It is the conviction of an offence mentioned in ss (1) that constitutes
the 'first', 'second' or 'third or subsequent offence' . . . whether or not
such a conviction constitutes a second or subsequent conviction is to
be determined with reference to the nature of the offender's prior
conviction. If they correspond, then the later conviction constitutes a
second offence for the purpose of s 35(1) (paras [20]-[21]).
In this particular case it was found that the appellant's convic-
tion was, for the purposes of section 35(1), a first offence and the
magistrate's order in this regard was consequently set aside
(para [28]).
Proof of contravention in terms of section 65(1) (a) of the National Road
Traffic Act 93 of 1996
In S v Mzimba 2012 (2) SACR 233 (KZP), the accused pleaded
guilty to a charge of contravening section 65(1)(a) of the National
Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996. However, the reading of a breatha-
lyzer result was not submitted to the court, and during question-
ing under section 112(1)(b) of the CPA, the accused did not admit
that his driving had been affected by the liquor he had consumed
(paras [5]-[6]).
On automatic review under of section 302 of the CPA, it was
emphasised that an accused must admit to all the elements of the
offence with which he is being charged. It was, therefore, not
enough that the accused had admitted to having consumed
liquor, he should also have admitted that this had influenced his
ability to drive (para [6]). The conviction and sentence were
consequently set aside, and the matter was remitted to the court
a quo for a plea of not guilty to be entered in terms of section 113
of the CPA (para [11]).
Arresting a suspect on a suspicion ofdriving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor
In Minister of Safety and Security & another v Swart 2012 (2)
SACR 226 (SCA), the respondent was arrested by a police officer
without a warrant on suspicion of driving a motor vehicle on a
public road whilst under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
basis for the arrest was that the respondent's vehicle had veered
off the road into a ditch, and that his breath had smelled of
alcohol (para [4]). The respondent was detained overnight until
the charges against him were withdrawn on the following day
when the tests revealed that his blood alcohol level at the time of
driving was below the permissible legal limit (para [1]).
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With reference to the requirements of section 40(1)(b) of the
Criminal Procedure Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that
the mere smell of alcohol on the respondent's breath was not
sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor and for that reason could not
drive a vehicle (para [18]). No corroborating evidence was
offered, it was not submitted that the respondent was unsteady
on his feet, that his speech was slurred, or that his eyes were
bloodshot, for example (para [21]). These well-known clinical
features of intoxication are still extremely important in proving the
effects of intoxication (Le Roux A 'Medico-legal aspects regard-
ing drunk driving' (2007) 2 South African Journal of Criminal
Justice 220-242).
PRESCRIBED MINIMUM SENTENCES
A previous conviction under of section 51 of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
In S v Owabe 2012 (1) SACR 347 (WCC), the appellant was
convicted on two counts of robbery with aggravating circum-
stances, the unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, and
two counts of attempted murder. He was sentenced to an
effective twenty years' imprisonment: twenty years for each count
of robbery; ten years on each count of attempted murder; and
one year on the count of possession of a dangerous weapon.
These counts were to run concurrently. With regard to the twenty
years imposed for each of the robbery convictions, the sentenc-
ing court applied section 51(2)(aXii) of the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act 105 of 1997, and regarded the appellant as a second
offender due to his previous convictions for assault with the intent
to inflict serious injury, and for robbery (para [19]). The sentenc-
ing court also found that there were no substantial and compel-
ling circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence
(para [6]).
On appeal it was held that the wording 'any such offence' in
section 51(2)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, requires
that the previous conviction must be an offence of the same kind
or degree as the offence for which offender is to be sentenced.
The appellant's previous conviction of robbery could therefore
not be elevated to robbery with aggravating circumstances for
the purpose of sentencing in terms of section 51(2)(a)(ii) of the
Act. The appellant was indeed a first offender of robbery with
293
ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
aggravating circumstances under section 51(2)(a)(i) of the Act,
and in terms of this provision, a minimum sentence of fifteen
years' imprisonment ought to have been imposed (para [35]).
See also S v Mokela 2012 (1) SACR 431 (SCA).
The discretion to impose a sentence exceeding the prescribed minimum
sentence
In S v Mathebula and another 2012 (1) SACR 374 (SCA), the
two appellants were convicted of robbery with aggravating
circumstances, unlawful possession of a firearm, and the unlaw-
ful possession of ammunition. The second appellant was also
convicted of the negligent discharge of a firearm in contravention
of subsections 39(1) and 39(2)(d) of the Arms and Ammunition
Act 75 of 1969. The first appellant was sentenced to an effective
23 years' imprisonment, and the second to an effective 24 years'
imprisonment. Both were sentenced to a term of twenty years'
imprisonment for the robbery with aggravating circumstances for
which the minimum sentence in terms of section 51(2)(a)(i) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 is only fifteen years.
The appeal court confirmed that a sentencing court has the
discretion to impose a sentence exceeding the prescribed
minimum sentence of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997. Such a discretion must, however, be exercised judicially
and be based on reasonable grounds. Where a magistrate
departs from the prescribed minimum sentences, reasons must
be provided for the departure. Where these are not forthcoming,
the conclusion becomes inescapable that the sentencing magis-
trate's decision is arbitrary, or that the sentencing discretion was
not exercised judicially (para [10]).
In S vMethembu 2012 (1) SACR 517 (SCA), it was emphasised
that the defence must be notified that the presiding officer is
contemplating imposing a sentence higher than the minimum
prescribed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.
PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES
In 2012 a number of cases were decided in which it was
alleged that certain procedural irregularities constituted a failure
of justice, and that the convictions and sentenced imposed had
to be set aside. In S v Daniels & another 2012 (2) SACR 459
(SCA), the court reconsidered the test for 'a failure of justice'. It
was held that a failure of justice will lead to an unfair trial, a review
or appeal court must, therefore, exclude all aspects of the trial
294
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SENTENCING
that were affected or influenced by the irregularity, and evaluate
whether the remaining evidence still supports the outcome in the
court a quo (para [14]; see also S v Carter 2007 (2) SACR 415
(SCA) and S vJaipa/2005 (1) SACR 215 (CC).
A procedural irregularity will, therefore, not automatically nullify
the proceedings, the review or appeal court must rather '. . .
reassess the evidence without the irregularity or defect in order to
determine whether a conviction must inevitably have followed'
(para [16]).
Interpreters
The applicants in Sayed & another v Levitt NO & another 2012
(2) SACR 294 (KZP), were charged with various counts under the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998, the Sexual
Offences Act 32 of 2007, and the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. The
applicants alleged that gross irregularities during the trial pro-
ceedings required that the proceedings be reviewed and set
aside under section 24 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.
Among their allegations was that the ad hoc interpreter used
during the trial proceedings had not been sworn in, nor was any
enquiry conducted into the interpreter's competency and ability
to interpret from Thai into English. This they supported from the
court record which showed that the interpreter was not fluent in
English, that there were times when the court did not understand
what was said, and it was difficult for those testifying to under-
stand the interpreter (para [3]). It was alleged that these irregu-
larities tainted the entire proceedings before the trial court, and
that the convictions had to be set aside (para [3]).
In considering whether these irregularities constituted a mis-
carriage of justice, it was found that they indeed impacted on the
evidence adduced, and that it should not have been found
admissible. However, as the presiding officer at the trial had
already considered the evidence and delivered a judgment
based on it, the irregularities could not be cured without prejudic-
ing the applicants (para [17]).
Emphasising the important role that interpreters play in legal
proceedings and the importance of adhering to all procedural
requirements in this regard, the court ordered that the proceed-
ings before the court a quo be set aside and that a trial
commence de novo before a different regional magistrate (para
[18]).
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Assessors
In S v du Plessis 2012 (2) SACR 247 (GSJ), the accused
appealed against his conviction and sentence alleging that the
trial court had failed to comply with the provisions of section
93te1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. In terms of this
provision, a judicial officer may summon the assistance of one or
two assessors before any evidence has been led, or in consider-
ing a community-based punishment in respect of any person who
has been convicted of any offence. Section 93te3) provides
expressly that once the members have been sworn in, they
become members of the court. Subsections (10) and (11)
address when an assessor is to be recused, or is no longer able
to continue with a sitting (para [3]). Section 93ter2) specifically
requires that assessors be appointed for murder trials in a lower
court unless the necessity to do so is waived by the accused
(para [10]).
In this case the magistrate had failed to comply with section
93te2). The record did not show that any assessors were
appointed either before the evidence commenced or thereafter
(para [4]). The record also did not reflect that any assessors were
sworn in or were given any directions as to their functions by the
magistrate. Nor was the accused afforded the opportunity to
elect to continue with the trial in the absence of assessors. The
judgment also did not indicate whether it was unanimous, or a
decision of the majority of the court (para [5]). It was, therefore,
concluded that the magistrate had not followed the provisions of
section 93ter of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944, and the
appeal court had to find on the effect of this irregularity (para
[10]).
The important role played by assessors in murder trials in lower
courts was emphasised. They not only assist the magistrate in
bridging any cultural or educational gaps that may exist between
the court and the accused, but may also decide on issues of fact.
Accused persons must, therefore, be given the opportunity to
make an informed decision whether to continue with the trial with
or in the absence of assessors (para [11]). The conviction and
sentence were set aside (para [26]). For a contrary decision see
S v Naicker 2008 (2) SACR 54 (N).
Written authorisation by the DPP as a requirement for a prosecution
In S v Molefe 2012 (2) SACR 574 (GNP), the accused pleaded
guilty to a charge of contravening section 113(1) read with
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sections 113(2) and (3) of the General Law Amendment Act 46 of
1935. It was alleged that she had unlawfully and with the intent to
conceal the fact of the birth of her child, attempted to dispose of
the body of the child. Before her conviction, however, the
magistrate asked the prosecutor whether the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) had authorised the prosecution in writing as
required by section 113(3) of the Act. It transpired that the DPP
had given only verbal consent. The magistrate nonetheless
convicted the accused but referred the matter for special review
(para [3]).
The review court found that the requirement that the DPP must
authorise the prosecution in writing is unequivocal and a prereq-
uisite for the prosecution in terms of section 113 of the General
Law Amendment Act 46 of 1935 (para [6]). It was further held that
the evidence did not prove that the accused tried to dispose of or
conceal the body of her child, and this was the central element of
the crime created in section 113 of the Act. There was also no
evidence that the foetus found by the police was older than 28
weeks and therefore viable (paras [10]-[12]). The conviction was
consequently set aside.
A RESTRAINT ORDER IN TERMS OF THE PREVENTION OF ORGANISED
CRIME ACT 121 OF 1998
The applicant in Naidoo and others v National Director of
Public Prosecutions and another 2012 (1) SACR 358 (CC), was
charged with 119 counts of dealing in unwrought metals. The
National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) obtained a
provisional restraint order against the applicant and his former
spouse under section 26 of the Prevention of Organised Crime
Act 121 of 1998 (POCA). The restraint order against the appli-
cant's former spouse was obtained on the basis that the specified
assets constituted an affected gift to her by the applicant. It also
covered two companies of which the applicant's wife was the
sole director and shareholder (para [2]).
The applicant subsequently applied for an order, in terms of
section 26(6) of POCA, for his reasonable legal expenses to be
paid from the restrained assets held by his former spouse and the
two companies (para [5]). The High Court found that the property
held by the applicant's former spouse was restrained because it
constituted an 'affected gift' from the applicant, and in terms of
the provisions of POCA. Legally, the property therefore belonged
297
ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
to the applicant and could be released to pay his legal expenses
(para [7]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, held that the plain
grammatical meaning of section 26(6)(b) of POCA, read with
section 26(6)(a), is that a restraint order may provide for the legal
expenses only of the person against whom it is made, and not for
the legal expenses of a third person against whom a restraint
order is also made at the same time (para [9]).
The applicant argued that the narrow interpretation of section
26(6) of POCA, as applied by the Supreme Court of Appeal,
infringed on his right to a fair trial and his right to employ legal
representatives of his choice. And, if the property was indeed to
be construed as an 'affected gift' then it should be regarded as
being held by the applicant who had made that gift (para [12]).
The Constitutional Court agreed with the finding of the Supreme
Court of Appeal and, taking into consideration the objective of
POCA, held that section 26(6) allows for reasonable living and legal
expenses only in limited terms. First, access is only granted for the
legal expenses of a person against whom the restraint order is
made, and this is conditional on full disclosure by that person of all
his or her assets. That person must further, not be able to meet the
expenses concerned out of his or her unrestrained property. Based
on these conditions, it was held, section 26(6) cannot reasonably be
interpreted also to give access to property held by a person other
than the person against whom the restraint order has been made
(para [20]). 'The provision for reasonable legal and living expenses
in s 26(6) is narrowly and finely crafted. Its careful mechanism
should not readily be overridden. And its overall legislative purpose
must be borne in mind' (para [30]).
SECTION 112 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The difference between sections 112(1) (a) and (b)
The accused in S v Kholoane 2012 (1) SACR 8 (FB), pleaded
guilty to four charges of theft and was sentenced to a fine of
R5 000 or 90 days' imprisonment. On special review under
section 304(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it emerged that the
accused had not been questioned in terms of section 112(1)(b) of
the CPA. The sentencing magistrate indicated that she had acted
in terms of section 112(1)(a) of the Act.
Section 112(1)(a) of the CPA applies to minor crimes which
ordinarily attract lenient sentences in terms of limited sentencing
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options. Judicial questioning is therefore not compulsory when an
accused is convicted in terms of section 112(1)(a) (para [3]).
Section 112(1)(b), however, applies to serious crimes which
usually attract more severe sentences and judicial questioning of
the accused is, therefore, peremptory (para [4]). The primary
purpose of such questioning is to determine whether the accused
indeed admits to all the elements of the crime to which he or she
is pleading guilty, and serves to protect an uneducated/unin-
formed/undefended accused from the adverse consequences of
an ill-informed plea of guilty (para [5]).
The review court held that as the accused in this particular
matter had not been questioned in terms of section 112(1)(b),
and the lawfulness of her conviction not confirmed, the sentence
could not simply be adjusted to fall within the limited sentencing
options available for section 112(1)(a) convictions. The sentenc-
ing magistrate's finding not only lacked procedural fairness, it
also lacked substantive fairness as the accused's guilt had not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt (para [17]).
A written statement in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977
In S v Mbuyisa 2012 (1) SACR 571 (SCA), the appellant
pleaded guilty, by way of a section 112(2) statement, to a charge
of attempted murder and was sentenced to eights years' impris-
onment conditionally suspended for four years. On appeal
against the conviction, the appellant argued that her section
112(2) written statement was no more than a regurgitation of the
allegations in the charge-sheet, and that it therefore lacked
the essential details relevant to the facts underlying the charge
(para [6]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, found that'. . . while it
is ... undesirable for allegations contained in the charge-sheet to
merely be repeated in a s 112(2) statement, there is no inflexible
rule that an accused who uses certain of its phraseology in a
charge cannot be convicted' (para [7]). All that is required from a
written section 112(2) statement, is that the accused admit to all
the essential elements of the charge, irrespective of whether this
is done in his or her own words, or with reference to the words
and phrases used in the charge sheet (para [8]).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPERATIONS
In Polonyfis v Minister of Police and others NNO 2012 (1) SACR
57 (SCA), members of the SAPS requested the magistrate
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(seventh respondent) to issue a search warrant for the appellant's
business premises under section 21 of the CPA. The application
for the search warrant was supported by an affidavit in which it
was claimed that the appellant had no licence for the casino
machines he held and operated on the premises. An undercover
operation in terms of section 252A of the CPA was also mounted,
and the allegations and suspicions that the appellant was operat-
ing an illegal casino were confirmed.
The search warrant was issued, and during a search the
premises, members of the SAPS seized cash, gambling
machines, a coin-counting machine, a scale used for weighing
tokens, tokens worth fifty cents each, documents, receipt books,
keys, ashtrays, chairs and some other smaller items (para [5]). In
the course of the search operation the appellant was asked for
his identity document which, he replied, was in his hotel room. A
member of the SAPS accompanied him to his hotel room to
retrieve the document. However, in the hotel room a book
containing telephone numbers was also seized. It was hoped that
the contact details of the appellant's employer were in this book.
The appellant attacked the lawfulness of the search and
seizure operation on four grounds: The warrant did not indicate
which subsection of section 20 of the CPA was applicable, the
address of the premises to be searched was described only
vaguely, the officers conducting the search did not present the
affidavit when the warrant was executed, and the execution of the
warrant was unlawful because the SAPS seized objects not
mentioned in the warrant (para [8]).
For a warrant to be justified, information showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been committed,
and that an article connected with the suspected crime is to be
found upon the particular premises, must be placed before the
officer issuing the warrant. In some instances, the search will be
for a particular article, while in others the existence of any
particular article will be uncertain. In the latter cases, however, it
can be expected that an article or articles of a particular kind will
exist if the offence was indeed committed. Such a search and
seizure operation makes material inroads into the rights of the
suspect, and it is important that the information before the issuing
officer sufficiently discloses a reasonable suspicion that an
offence had been committed. The resulting warrant must autho-
rise only that which is strictly permitted under the CPA. A search
and seizure warrant must, therefore, be clear and within the limits
set by the CPA (para [9]).
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With regard to the appellant's contention that the warrant was
invalid because the magistrate did not indicate which subsection
of section 20 applied, the court held that the magistrate had
substantiated his decision well, and that it was accepted that all
three subsections of section 20 applied to the targeted articles
envisaged in the warrant. The magistrate was therefore correct in
not limiting the warrant to any of the subsections of section 20
(para [13]).
The appellant's second and third grounds of attack - that the
address in the warrant was too vague, and that the search was
invalid because the authorised officer did not present the affidavit
together with the warrant - were also rejected. The warrant is
required to describe the premises to be searched in sufficient
detail to allow the official authorised to search to identify it.
Absolute accuracy in the description of the premises is not
required, nor will a technically incorrect address automatically
invalidate the warrant if it otherwise describes the premises with
sufficient clarity (para [16]). Further, when the authorising officer
read out and handed over the warrant, the appellant did not
demand the affidavit. Had he done so, it would have been
available as the officer had it at the time of the search. While the
authorising officer recognised that it was an oversight on his part
not to hand over the affidavit, the appellant also did not demand it
and this ground of attack therefore failed (para [21 ]).
However, in this search and seizure operation, the SAPS seized
articles that were not covered by the warrant and could also not
justify the seizure of these articles on any other ground. The High
Court therefore correctly ordered that the articles be returned, but
this did not nullify the entire search and seizure operation. The
conduct of the police in this particular case, did not amount to an
abuse of power or a gross violation of the appellant's rights - it
merely exceeded its ambit. This is rectified in the High Court
order for the return of the articles (paras [22]-[23]). The appeal
was dismissed with costs.
See also Minister of Safety and Security and others v Mohamed
and another 2012 (1) SACR 321 (SCA), on the validity require-
ments for search and seizure warrants, that the warrant must be
intelligible or capable of being understood, and must authorise
no more than is allowed under the authorising statute. See further,
S v Van Deventer& another 2012 (2) SACR 263 (WCC), where the
search and seizure warrant was based on an incorrect statute
and items were seized that did not fall within the ambit of the
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warrant. Notwithstanding this, the court found that the evidence
remained admissible as its admission was not unfair to the
appellants or detrimental to the administration of justice. How-
ever, in Ivanov v North West Gambling Board & others 2012 (2)
SACR 408 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that once a
warrant has been declared invalid: '. . . the invasion of privacy
and the search and seizure cannot retain the lawfulness thereof,
as the essence of what made the dispossession lawful falls away'
(para [17]).
SENTENCING IN CASES WHERE THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATORY CONNOTATIONS
In S v Combrink 2012 (1) SACR 93 (SCA), the appellant fired
shots at and killed an unidentified person walking across his
farmland. The deceased was later identified as one of his farm
workers and he was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifteen
years' imprisonment, five years of which were suspended for five
years on the usual conditions.
With reference to the exposition in S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR
469 (SCA), (2001 (2) SA 1222; [2001] 3 All SA 220), it was held
that the trial court focused exclusively on the mitigating factors
and failed adequately to consider the aggravating factors. For
example, the appellant's personal circumstances were over-
stated and the personal circumstances of the deceased and the
gravity of the offence were virtually ignored (para [22]). The only
aggravating circumstance mentioned during sentencing was that
after realising that he had shot the deceased, the appellant had
failed immediately to assist him. The appellant also showed no
remorse and continued to deny that he had committed any
offence (para [23]).
Courts were also cautioned to be conscious of and sensitive to
cases which appear to have a racial or discriminatory connota-
tion: '[T]he public is incensed with (sic) sentences that appear to
favour a particular group in society. The public interest is one of
the essential considerations in determining an appropriate sen-
tence.'. This is important as the effect of hate crimes goes far
beyond the victims of the crime, and serves to traumatise whole
communities and damage South African society (para [24]). The
sentence was amended to fifteen years' imprisonment.
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SPECIAL SENTENCING PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF SECTION 276 OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
Section 276A(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
In Ex Parte Department of Correctional Services: In re S v
Mtshabe 2012 (1) SACR 526 (ECM), the procedure and operation
of section 276A(3) of the CPA came under scrutiny. The chairman
of the Parole Board of the Amathole Management Area applied
for the sentence of the prisoner to be reconsidered in terms of
section 276A(3)(a) of the CPA, so that the prisoner could be
released from prison, and for the balance of his sentence to
be converted to one of correctional supervision subject to
conditions. At the time of this application, the prisoner had served
two years of his eight year term.
Griffiths J for the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, ques-
tioned why the matter was not being considered by the presiding
officer who had presided at the trial and sentencing, as section
276A(3)(c)(i) specifically requires that such a matter be brought
before the trial judge, and only if he or she is not available, that a
different judicial officer of the same court be appointed to preside
over the application. It was held that the fact that presiding
judicial officer is on long-leave does not make him or her
'unavailable' to hear the matter, and that the matter should stand
over until the presiding officer's return (para [7]). It is evident that
the legislature intended the judicial officer who presided over the
trial and sentencing to assume primary responsibility for any
reconsideration of sentence (para [23]) as he or she is in the
best position to reconsider the sentence originally imposed. The
trial judge will be able to reconsider all the factors and circum-
stances he or she considered in imposing the original sentence,
and to reconsider the sentence in terms of section 276A(3) of
the CPA. If a different presiding officer reconsiders the sentence
under section 276A(3), there is a risk that the factors originally
considered, may be played down, or that new factors be over-
emphasised. This could result in a miscarriage of justice (para
[18]).
Whether a trial judge is 'unavailable' for the purposes of section
276A(3)(c)(i), is a question which depends on the merits of each
case, and one that should be approached with a measure of
flexibility, but also with due consideration of the preference for the
trial judge to reconsider the sentence [para [24]).
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Section 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
In Ex parte Department of Correctional Services: In re S v
Mtshabe 2012 (1) SACR 526 (ECM), the court emphasised that
the interests of the Department of Correctional Services in
prisoners being released early in response to overcrowding
in South African prisons, did not warrant exceptions being made
or processes being fast-tracked (para [27]). Sentencing orders
serving only the interests of the Department of Correctional
Services or those of the court, were also criticised in S v Stander
2012 (1) SACR 527 (SCA). Here the appellant was convicted on
22 counts of fraud and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment of
which two years were conditionally suspended for five years. The
magistrate also ordered, under section 276B of the CPA, that
the appellant serve at least 36 months of his sentence before he
could be released on parole (para [1]). The magistrate, in his
reasons for refusing the appellant leave to appeal, stated that
the only reason why the court refused parole was to prevent the
Department of Correctional Supervision from the burdening
the court, after the appellant had served three years of his
sentence, with an application to have the sentence converted
under section 276A(3) of the CPA (para [5]).
The Supreme Court of Appeal criticised this 'order of conve-
nience' and held that it constitutes a serious misdirection where
such orders are made solely for the convenience of the Depart-
ment of Correctional Supervision and/or the court (para [6]).
Decisions on parole are generally regarded as the exclusive
domain of the Department of Correctional Services, and until
section 276B was enacted, no statute empowered a court to
make orders regarding the period of imprisonment to be served
before release on parole could be considered (para [8]). Despite
this empowering provision, courts were warned not to venture
into the terrain traditionally reserved for the executive (para [12]).
A stringent statutory procedure exists for the consideration of a
prisoner's release on parole, and the Department of Correctional
Services (and not the sentencing court) is ultimately in the best
position to make decisions on a prisoner's release (para [13]).
Therefore, before a court makes a non-parole order, excep-
tional circumstances must exist and what these circumstances
are, will depend on the particular facts of the case (para [20); see
Pauls vS [2011] JOL 26717 (ECG)).
Section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
The appellant in S v Truyens 2012 (1) SACR 79 (SCA), was
convicted of stock theft in contravention of section 11 of the Stock
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Theft Act 57 of 1959, and sentenced to four years' imprisonment
under section 276(1)(i) of the CPA. In terms of this provision, the
appellant had to serve only a minimum period of eight months'
imprisonment before being eligible for consideration for place-
ment under correctional supervision.
It is clear from the record that the sentencing magistrate
carefully considered the appellant's circumstances before decid-
ing on an appropriate sentence. While the appellant had previous
convictions for theft, a considerable time had elapsed between
the earlier and the current conviction. It also emerged that the
appellant only stole and sold the stock in order to pay the medical
expenses for his three sick children. Even though he had initially
pleaded not guilty, the magistrate found that he was contrite, he
did not offer a false version in an attempt to evade responsibility,
and he eventually confessed fully to the charges and expressed
the hope that he would now have a chance to change his life
(para [13]). However, while the magistrate had sympathy for his
unique personal circumstances, he also felt that to suspend the
sentence in its entirety, was not appropriate, especially as
the appellant had abused his employer's trust (para [17]).
Section 276(1)(i) of the CPA is appropriate when the sentenc-
ing court cpnsiders that a custodial sentence is warranted, but
the nature of the offence is such that an extended period of
incarceration is not appropriate (see S v Scheepers 2006 (1)
SACR 72 (SCA); para [18]]). A sentence under section 276(1)(i)
should also not be seen as a softer option than an ordinary
sentence of direct imprisonment. It is said merely to grant the
Commissioner the latitude to consider an early release under
correctional supervision - after one-sixth of the sentence has
been served, and only if the personal circumstances of the
offender warrant it. In terms of section 276A(3)(a) of the Act,
the Commissioner may apply to the sentencing court to recon-
sider a sentence not exceeding five years' imprisonment, or
exceeding five years' imprisonment where the date of release is
no more than five years away (para [27]).
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